Constitutional Reform: Crossing the floor and The Right of Recall!

It can hardly be a surprise that, with the single exception of the powers of the prime minister, no other issue occupied the minds of Saint Lucians interviewed by the Constitutional Reform Commission more than “the nature of the electoral system and the general elections environment.” 

According to the report submitted after some seven years of consultations to parliament by Justice Suzie d’Auvergne’s Constitutional Reform Commission, and debated in the House on 18 August 2015, the commissioners had acknowledged the consensus that “this constitutional power of the prime minister tended to give an unfair advantage to the ruling political party that would always select an election date most convenient to them.”

The commission took into account the system that provides for a vote of no confidence against the government and suggested it might be impractical to maintain “that important instrument of censure” while instituting the fixed-date elections. It recommended that our “every five years” situation be replaced by a fixed date, except under circumstances where a successful no-confidence motion automatically triggered a dissolution of the Parliament of Saint Lucia.  

The commission strongly advocated the retention of the current constitutional provision that empowers the Head of State to dissolve the parliament “if the prime minister fails either to resign or advise dissolution within three days of the passing of a resolution of no confidence in the government.”

If I may be permitted a personal observation: Whenever the question of rights arises here—and it does, daily—someone is certain to reference the d’Auvergne report along with the line that the related 2015 House debate had marked the only time the government and the opposition found common ground. Often they will add that both sides of the House had united in their opposition of the recommended Right of Recall.  

But then, how true is that? This from the report: “Against the backdrop of tremendous concern expressed by Saint Lucians about the behavior of elected parliamentarians, lack of accountability between elections, and general limited contact between parliamentary representatives and constituents, the commission considered the proposals to make parliamentary representatives more responsive to the people . . .” 

A number of mechanisms were contemplated that had been utilized in various jurisdictions to create a closer relationship between constituents and the elected members of parliament. In the opinion of the commission, the recall mechanism offered a best practice which could easily be adopted without seriously undermining the working of the system.

The commission explained that the mechanism is designed to trigger a recall election of an elected official “who in the view of the electorate has failed to perform or has violated a regulation.” It was globally considered, by the commission’s measure, one of the best means of institutionalizing a form of direct democracy in which the politically relevant citizens are able to cut short the term of an elected representative through a public vote.

While there were several modalities “as a general rule, using the recall mechanism requires the affected citizens to sign a petition. Only when “a sufficient number of the electorate signs the petition would a recall process be initiated.”

The commission emphasized that “a recall should only be initiated on very limited and specific grounds and should be subject to a time line.” The following conditions had to be first satisfied: Non-performance in relation to constituency duties and which could only be initiated after the MP has served at least half of his or her parliamentary term. Or, breach of a law, rule or ethical standard established by parliament.

There was also the matter of political terpsichoreans. The commission recommended that “an automatic recall should commence in the case of a Member of Parliament crossing the floor, which would lead to an automatic vacating of the parliamentary seat.” 

The MP for Castries Central, when he addressed the matter of a fixed date for general elections, had religion on his mind. “Mr. Speaker, the fixed date may fall on a Sunday,” he said. “Would this mean we’d be constitutionally bound to have a general election on a Saturday or a Sunday? Food for thought.” 

He suggested that if the date fell on days normally set aside for religious purpose the elections should be held on the following Monday. He felt certain his fellow parliamentarians would not be opposed to his suggestion.

As for crossing the floor and the Right of Recall, the MP considered the recommendations of the commission, “so funny.” He chose to offer his “own situation” for consideration. “Say, the leader of the opposition and his cahoots fired me.” 

He paused, smiled, abandoned the hypothetical in favor of the anecdotal. “Let us deal with the Richard Frederick issue,” he said. “There is a provision in law here . . . I want to use my own situation to understand what the Constitution is saying: If you run for elections on the ticket of one party and after you have won you want to cross the floor to another party, the votes you received can be taken from you and you have to go through another election. I understand that. But what the Constitution does not make provision for is that when they fire you, as the leader of the United Workers Party and his partners fired me . . . I want to know, where is the constitutional provision for this? I did not cross the floor. They fired me. They kicked me out. They removed me.” 

That smile again that spoke volumes. “When a man finds himself in the political wilderness,” he went on, “does this amount to crossing the floor?”  

The member for Castries East, also deputy prime minister, chose to address the power of the prime minister. From his vantage the commission’s recommendations would render the office of the prime minister “almost, well, it strips the prime minister of all the power a prime minister should have. What it does is that it gives people, people from outside who were not elected, the privilege to make rules, to dictate to the people who were elected what to do. And then the prime minister will be at the whims and fancies of all these people.” 

It was difficult to follow the member’s thinking. Several times he spoke as if particular individuals had already been handpicked to undertake particular functions, especially in relation to the power of the prime minister. From his vantage the commission’s recommendations in that regard made little sense.

“Mr. Speaker, our system dictates that the prime minister should have some measure of control over the people who are in the government with him,” he said. “I am sure a businessman, a CEO, would have some measure of control over his employees, because in the final analysis the prime minister is the most equal among equals. The U.S. president has veto powers. So even though there is a cabinet and a congress the president can veto what happens in the congress. I may be wrong, but I have seen no powers of veto in the document before us.”

He took another leap aboard the business metaphor: “Mr. Speaker, when people look to invest in major companies they look at who is the CEO. Who will be the person to manage their money. But in our system we believe that because one is a politician he ought not to have any say in the running of the country because he may not be the best brain or he may not have what we believe is enough sense or enough intelligence or enough education. And the prime minister is worse.”

For a split second it seemed he would address something related directly to the commission’s recommendations: “I think elections should have a fixed date so that everyone will know at a particular time when elections are taking place.” From here he moved immediately to the bottom line: “I think politicians should be accountable but I also think politicians should be paid.”

He returned to the business model: “I never understand why CEOs in every company, not even a major company, have certain perks and privileges that we must not have, just because we happen to be politicians.” Who knew back then that the time was just around the corner when a new prime minister would be excoriated for saying he intended to operate his government as if it were a business?

At last the Castries East MP arrived at the Right of Recall. “These things sound very nice in theory,” he said. “They sound very nice to the people who are talking. But the reality is never considered. How do you recall a parliamentarian? What is the basis? You say it’s when he has not performed in his constituency. If you have a situation where the parliamentarian is given a certain level of resources to manage himself, then you can have the power of recall. But if the parliamentarian does not have the resources, how can you recall him?”

The member for Micoud North welcomed the recommended Right of Recall, on the basis that “if the people think it is right that a member be recalled, if they believe they have reasons for a recall . . . the people who elect you should have the right to dismiss you” in accordance with the stated procedures.

The Castries South MP also supported the Right of Recall, if only conditionally. He was of the view that the recall should not be based on a member having been dumped by his party. Score one for Richard Frederick!

Next Week: Philip J. Pierre comments on the commission’s recommendations in relationship to the ticklish subject of term limits for prime ministers.