For a nation with a history so closely linked to the Cold War battle between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), between capitalism and communism, Russia’s present foreign policy goals in the Caribbean and wider Latin America are pragmatic; or at least they must be in order for Russia to achieve anything that resembles the influence the USSR once had here. Its ambition: to craft a future where Moscow’s authority in the region grows instead of recedes.
On the other side of the coin, nations throughout the Caribbean and wider Latin America recognise that Moscow’s influence is certainly not what it was in the days of the USSR but, as it retains a key role in a number of the region’s most high octane hotspots, for better or worse, its presence must be factored in to any future that sees peace and prosperity grow.
Getting Passed the Past
The Russian state today retains the architecture of a great power akin to what the USSR once was. It is a nation with over 145 million people, covering a huge territory, with a nuclear capability and the capacity to project power across multiple oceans surrounding its borders, and the diplomatic nouse that comes with permanent membership on the UN Security Council, together with influence in other halls of power. Despite this, Russia today is by no measure the global hegemon the USSR was.
An Authority Figure for Mother Russia
Following the end of the Cold War, Russia spent much of the next decade re-imagining its place in the world. Depending on your view, the 1990s was either a time of great optimism for Russia’s democratic future, or of great weakness, with the country adrift from its past. Either way, once the 2000s rolled around, Vladimir Putin arrived on the scene, and he has spent the last two decades working to restore and project Russia’s geopolitical strengths locally and globally.
Within Russia’s backyard, territorial incursions in Georgia during 2008 and Ukraine during 2014 confirmed to Russians and the international community Putin’s vision of a 21st century Russia: one where it retains dominance over the Eastern European arena. In complement to this, Russia has faced accusations of violating the territory of nations like Sweden and South Korea with aircraft and submarines, alongside engaging in ongoing spats with the European Union.
Then there are the accusations of Russian-backed assassinations and poisonings of residents in the UK, like Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 2018, and allegations of Russian interference in the US presidential election of 2016. These confirm the impression that the Russian government does indeed behave like a “mafia state”, as US diplomats described in leaked diplomatic cables that were published by Wikileaks in 2010.
The Ideology of Incidents
Taken together, these incidents read like a roll call of a nation-state’s checklist for behaving badly on the world stage; but it’s the collective nature of them that is most critical to understanding modern Russia and to what is aspires in Latin America. Moscow has a quest for greater influence, certainly, but there is sometimes a strong armed element to its approach that can make allies and rivals alike uneasy.
Xi Jinping, the leader of Russia’s neighbour, China, won’t be winning a Nobel Peace Prize anytime soon, given the Chinese government’s destabilisation efforts in the South China Sea, but he has generally had a more measured and cautious approach to advancing China’s territorial goals. This speaks to the reality of the Russia-China relationship, and how it has inverted rapidly over just a few decades.
The Moscow and Beijing Relationship in the Region
Previously, when the USSR was reigning, Moscow knew – even when allowing for the tensions of the Sino-Soviet split – that its global goals would be undermined if its fellow communist government in Beijing provoked outcry and isolation around the world. Today the Chinese government recognises that a reckless Russia will require it to prioritise resources up north, instead of down south in Asia where it envisions that its greatest growth in wealth and power will occur in years ahead.
For the relationship to function, Beijing must respect Russia’s ongoing vigil for its past, and Moscow must recognise the reality of China’s growing power – and this isn’t an easy balance to strike. Yet ultimately, these two nations share similar goals in Latin America. Both are resistant to a Western-led world, confident in the supremacy of authoritarian models, and conscious that their survival depends upon their citizens continuing to believe that the greatest threat to their daily lives lies beyond their borders.
When Russia’s perpetually unpredictable behaviour is considered, alongside China’s more measured approach to growing influence in the region, and the shared goal to undermine US influence here, a clear picture can be formed of the international undercurrents that impact domestic disputes within the region, as in Venezuela.
In March of this year, Russia’s existing troop deployment in Venezuela – part of an ongoing partnership between Moscow and Caracas – saw the addition of around 100 extra Russian boots on the ground. This did not enhance the prospects of a peaceful resolution to the nation’s leadership crisis, but it certainly advanced Russia’s interest. So too its ongoing friendships with the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua.
The friendship with Cuba enables Russia to bolster Cuba’s quest to be a perpetual thorn in the side of Washington’s interest in the region. The friendship with Nicaragua sees Moscow rebuilding to strengthen a relationship that never disappeared once the USSR fell but, for many years, was a shell of its former self. Since 2014 Moscow has been supplying weaponry to Nicaragua; in 2015 it won approval for a satellite ground station in the Central American nation and, in 2018, it sought to block UN involvement in the nation.
Russia in The OECS
In tandem with its ventures elsewhere in wider Latin America, Russia has been developing new relationships within the Caribbean. Overall, Russia’s presence in the region, compared to that of other powers such as China, remains small. However, by many measures, this current chapter has the highest level of engagement since the Cold War, with a number of new high-profile deals struck between Moscow and regional nations.
In 2017 Russia and Grenada agreed to a visa-waiver deal that would allow Russians and Grenadians to travel between their two nations without a visa, doing so while also flagging an increase in discussions around technical co-operation. In 2018 the Dominican government announced it had also secured a visa-waiver agreement with Russia. The same year Moscow announced it was pursuing closer military ties with Suriname, including the signing of an agreement on military-technical co-operation.
The regional relationship with Russia also has room to grow further beyond government-to-government ties exclusively. Russians are well-represented in the region’s many citizenship by investment programmes. More widely, Russian tourism to the region has been flourishing in recent years. As well as the longstanding popularity of Cuba among Russian travellers, the past decade has seen the Dominican Republic and Jamaica experience a surge in Russian visitor numbers.
Collectively, these trends affirm that even if Russia’s official presence in the Caribbean is small right now, it is growing in a number of commercial areas. If the Russian government can devote its energy to properly supporting this public and private activity, these could be the early days of a promising new era of economic growth.
