For the Republic of China (hereafter called Taiwan) 2019 is seeing it face a greater threat to its way of life than it has for many years. The island-nation of 23 million has always faced an existential danger since those who claimed it to be China’s rightful government moved in exile to the island in 1949, the mainland ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) holding the island to be part of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter called China). But for seventy years the nation has hung on and grown into a prosperous, democratic society.
The world looks very different in 2019 than it did in 1949. Recent years have seen China not only test the status quo of co-existence between Taipei and Beijing, but begin work to actively drive it to the brink. In this climate Taiwan knows that the next ten years won’t be anything like the last seventy, and it must secure allies on which it can rely, not only for the next year but in perpetuity.
Can it really do this? And in what ways?
A Decline in Relations Raises the Stakes
Although nobody would mistake Beijing and Taipei for allies, the past decade saw a cooling of tension, and warming of relations. However, since the ascension of Tsai Ing-wen to Taiwan’s presidency in 2016, relations have soured. Depending on your perspective, this is a result of either Ing-wen’s rejection of reunification, or the Chinese government’s rising power and growing impatience with Taiwan not coming under its control, or a combination or both. Either way, it’s undisputed that Beijing, having successfully lured many diplomatic allies away from Taipei in recent years, has weakened Taiwan’s standing internationally.
The critical danger for Taiwan in this scenario is the recent shifts of nations like Panama, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, giving rise to a perception of inevitability. Taiwan now has under twenty allies remaining who officially recognise it. So is it a hopeless cause for nations to stay linked with Taipei instead of switching over to Beijing?
This is a perception that Beijing would like to actively encourage. However, new woes have arisen domestically and in foreign policy for Beijing, which means that many nations no longer accept its narrative of perpetual progress and economic growth. Put simply, China will have to work harder to grow in future than it has done in years prior, and this informs the dynamic between Beijing and Taipei.
The Land of the Free Leading New Trade
In generations gone by, many powerhouses in global manufacturing would produce much of their output in-country. Today, a piece of tech designed in America could well have Japanese metals and South Korean components, and be assembled in Taiwan. A free trade agreement (FTA) between the US and Taipei would be a benefit to both nations, and streamline numerous supply chains.
In order to entice nations in Latin America (LATAM) and further afield to commit to Taipei for the long-term, Taiwan needs to pursue the sort of economic ties that make a break to Beijing unthinkable. This is no easy task to do. Yet there are avenues here where Taipei can not only build new foundations, but also drive home the differences between it and Beijing in a future relationship.
The most important FTA for Taipei to pursue at present, to benefit its standing in the region, is actually with Washington. Taiwan isn’t just after economic growth; it needs enhanced diplomatic clout, and while the US has long served as a security partner with Taiwan, the policy since the Carter administration — of ‘strategic ambiguity’ surrounding to what extent it would intervene, should Beijing invade— has seen other nations diminish their relationship with Taiwan.
Now, as the US government identifies in Beijing a challenger, and although the Trump administration is overall not famous for its foreign policy consistency, it has been credited as being the first in many decades to push back comprehensively against Beijing’s growing ambitions and territorial incursions. An FTA between Washington and Taipei would be a clear signal of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s future, and Washington’s support of it.
Speaking a Common Language
What Taiwan can offer smaller LATAM nations is a shared sense of vision and determination to be independent as a smaller nation. Usually, a country of 23 million that recorded a (nominal) GDP of US$573 billion in 2017 would not be classified as a little nation but its geographic positioning and standing in the world, relative to its colossal neighbour, means it has pursued the path in diplomacy of a bulldog instead of a bear.
In doing so, it can speak a common language with Caribbean nations, and without the strategic concerns that a deal with the CPC in Beijing involves. This manifests itself in alliances that are respectful of independence and free societies, something the CPC in Beijing cannot offer now, or promise in future, given the ongoing concerns surrounding Huawei’s 5G network, debt-trap diplomacy, and other issues relating to the Chinese government’s Belt and Road initiative or its contentious reunification of Hong Kong.
Despite this, it’s not all rosy for Taipei in the Caribbean. Taiwan retains a strong fossil fuels industry. Just as Taiwan is threatened by China, so too are Caribbean nations threatened by climate change in which Taiwan remains a notable contributor. This is unquestionably an odorous element of Taiwan’s foreign policy platform in the region.
Nonetheless, while Beijing likes to advertise its environmental credentials and has sought to appoint itself the leader of the green initiative globally in the Trump era, concerns have also been raised surrounding its commitment to green energy domestically, with accusations that chemical plants continue to engage in clandestine pollution, notably in the Hebei province in which the capital of Beijing resides.
Taiwan’s Window of Opportunity
The value of China’s economy in relative terms isn’t going anywhere, but the increased tension between Washington and Beijing has meant that many nations have paused in, or stepped back from, greater engagement with China, whether by choice or by the gulf created as a result of the brewing trade war between the world’s two largest economies.
It’s not only trade tensions that have seen Beijing under new scrutiny. The instability in Hong Kong, high profile arrests of Canadian nationals, among others — seen by many as a form of political payback for scandals such as the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in December 2018 — and slowdown in China’s economy have all taken the lustre off Beijing’s bold declaration of its future promise.
For Taiwan there is an opportunity here. LATAM nations that were once considering a shift to Beijing now recognise that the rising power may have a bumpy road ahead. Seizing on this opportunity means ensuring that existing relationships are cemented, and any new ones are pursued in the same spirit.
