The New Battle for Taiwan

2524

It is rare that nations like Saint Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis or Haiti will find a decision made by their government today could trigger a chain of events leading to war tomorrow. Yet recent weeks have indeed shown that the future of Taiwan’s security – and any resultant war via a threat to it – could be deeply informed by dynamics in the Caribbean and wider Latin America. 

This follows the news last month that the Solomon Islands and Kiribati would cut formal diplomatic relations with Taipei and recognise Beijing, leaving Taiwan with two less formal diplomatic allies in Asia.

Recent weeks have seen a new darkness cast across the future of Taiwan (Source: Pixabay)

Circling the Battlefield 

Since Xi Jinping’s ascent to the Chinese presidency in 2013, the ruling Communist Party of China has reverted to a far more authoritarian bent, domestically and globally. This is a sharp break from the style of the previous ruler Hu Jintao who, although no champion of democracy or human rights, was largely technocratic, seeking to focus on China’s economic growth over cultural crackdowns, and seemingly content for the ‘status quo’ to remain between Taipei and Beijing. 

This all changed with China’s current president – the country’s most powerful ruler since Mao – intent on asserting China’s power anywhere he deems appropriate. Bringing Taiwan under his rule would be a jewel in the crown for Xi’s legacy. He has presided over an aggressive campaign to undermine, isolate and silence Taiwan internationally. The aim has been to break the will of the Taiwanese people, with recent years seeing a particularly heavy emphasis placed on stripping Taiwan of its few remaining diplomatic allies.

A Caribbean Calculation 

The Chinese government delights in speculation about a future war with Taiwan; also the profound reversal of fortune that has occurred within a lifetime, beginning when Beijing took over the UN Security Council seat that Taiwan held in the early 1970s. Then, just last month, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati cut ties with Taipei for Beijing. 

Taiwan now has just four diplomatic allies in Asia; save for Eswatini (Swaziland) in Africa and the Holy See in Europe, its remaining nine are all in Latin America and the Caribbean. So what happens next? 

The prospect of a People’s Liberation Army annexation of Taiwan may still remain improbable, but the likelihood continues to grow the more isolated Taiwan becomes internationally. In January Xi said Taiwan “must and will” be reunited with the mainland and reserved the right to use force in achieving it. This followed Xi’s remarks to the CPC’s 19th Party Congress in 2017.

Diplomatic Dollars

Beijing is now expected to reinforce its efforts to see nations in this region switch sides. Central to this goal will be the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Nations like Jamaica, Barbados, and Antigua and Barbuda have signed up to the BRI in hopes of participating in the immense economic opportunities the initiative purports to offer.

In Xi’s era, Beijing has become very skilled at the ‘carrot and stick’ approach to diplomacy, promising the benefits of the BRI to nations that switch sides. At the same time, China is demonstrating a readiness to leave out in the cold those who do not switch, who must watch while their neighbours receive economic stimulus. That said, other stakeholders in this struggle are refining their own carrot and stick approach in diplomacy.

The Taipei Act is currently making its way through Washington DC. If passed, the US secretary of state would have new powers to rapidly reduce America’s diplomatic presence in nations that decide to jump ship from Taipei in favour of Beijing. Powers include reducing or ending all forms of American foreign assistance to countries that side with China, and those which America believes are aiding China in growing its influence in America’s ‘back yard’.

The actions of the US provide some support to Taiwan and look to offset Beijing’s growing might. However, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a subsequent military response by Washington and other Taipei allies would be economically ruinous for all involved, and even nations that are not. The economic aftershocks of any conflict involving Washington and Beijing would make waves all across the world. Xi and China’s elite know this but they also have an array of issues at home, including the ongoing unrest in the financial powerhouse of Hong Kong, the inhabitants of which are challenging China’s dominance in scenes that will likely foreshadow any Chinese attempts at a possible Taiwanese annexation.  

Meanwhile, late September also saw the one-year anniversary of the EU-Asia Connectivity scheme, a development partnership led by the EU and Japan, intending to offer an alternative to China’s BRI. So far the scheme has been focused on building a presence in the Indo-Pacific, the Balkans and Africa, but its emphasis on training in sovereign debt management – seen as a direct rebuke to widespread concerns about the BRI being a vessel for debt-trap diplomacy – means Brussels and Tokyo know such a scheme could find a larger audience in wider Asia and LATAM, just as it has
in Europe and Africa.

Leadership of Little Nations

Local leaders need to think carefully now. Nations always have loyalty to their own people in the first instance and must pursue their interests accordingly. A new deal with Beijing would undoubtedly offer many enticing economic incentives but smaller nations in this region need to consider in what world they would like to operate, heading into the 2020s. 

Current global issues include the ongoing US trade war, impeachment proceedings set to begin against US President Donald Trump (adding to further market instability in the US before an unpredictable 2020 election), the ongoing turmoil of Brexit, the worrying prospect of conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, not to mention the slow-motion train wreck of the Venezuelan economy. Making sudden moves in this arena is done amid many economic risks and unfolding challenges. 

Ultimately, nobody in Taiwan would wish for a war and, save for the one in Beijing, few other governments would. The challenge ahead for the international community is convincing Chinese leaders that Beijing does not have an inalienable right to reunify the island-nation of Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing may be increasingly confident that it could win a war with Taiwan and continue its reign as a world power, but history is replete with similar foibles, as seen when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and with the toppling of the Berlin Wall less than a decade later.